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INTRODUCTION

Few people would argue that the state of our nation's
prisons and jails is ideal. Apart from whatever other ills
plague these institutions, overcrowding is pervasive. Populations have doubled in a decade, and with preventive detention, mandatory minimum sentences, habitual offender
statutes, and the abolition of parole in some jurisdictions,
there is no relief in sight. Some states are even leasing or
purchasing prison space in other states. And it is costing the
taxpayers more than seventeen million dollars a day to operate the facilities, with estimates ranging up to sixty dollars a
day per inmate. Several commentators have not so face* Barnard T. Welsh Scholar and Professor of Law and Justice, The American University, Washington College of Law. A.B. 1970, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1973, Harvard University.
The reader should be aware that I served as the Reporter on Legal Issues for
the National Institute ofJustice's National Forum on "Corrections and the Private
Sector" (Feb. 1985). I also authored the report on prison privatization that accompanied a Resolution presented by the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section to the ABA House of Delegates, recommending that "jurisdictions
that are considering the privatization of prisons and jails not proceed ... until the
complex constitutional, statutory, and contractual issues are satisfactorily developed and resolved." The Resolution was passed by the House of Delegates at its
February, 1986 meeting. I am currently serving as Reporter for the ABA Criminal
Justice Section's study on the privatization of corrections, under grants from the
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the National Institute of
Justice. That project, which will include as one of its sections a modified version
of this Article, will culminate in late 1988 in the publication of a monograph on
the legal aspects of prison privatization. Of course, the analyses, conclusions, and
points of view expressed in this Article do not necessarily represent the positions
of the American Bar Association, the MacArthur Foundation, or the National Institute of Justice.
Finally, I am grateful to Wayne Ault and Anne Palmer for their assistance in
the preparation of this Article.
Copyright © 1988 by Ira P. Robbins. All rights reserved.
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tiously noted that we could finance college educations at less
cost for all of the inmates in the country.'
To reduce some of this stress on the system, a new concept has emerged: the privatization of corrections facilities,
occasionally known as "prisons for profit. " 2 The idea is to
remove the operation (and sometimes the ownership) of an
institution from the local, state, or federal government and
turn it over to a private corporation.
At the outset, it should be emphasized that private prisons are different from private industries in prison. The latter
concept refers to Retired Chief Justice Burger's "factories
with fences" proposal, which seeks to turn prisoners into
productive members of society by having them work at a decent wage and produce or perform services that can be sold
in the marketplace. 3 In the process, the prisoners would be
able to pay off some of the costs of their incarceration and,
we would hope, gain some self-esteem.
Privatization is also different from the situation in which
some of the services of a facility-such as medical, food, educational, or vocational services-are contracted out to private industry. Rather, the developing idea, which may turn
out to be a lasting force or just a passing fancy, is to have the
government contract with a private company to run the total
institution.
The privatization concept has sparked a major debate.
Its proponents, who include not only some corrections professionals, but also major financial brokers who advise investors to consider putting their money into private prisons,
argue that the government has been doing a dismal job of
administering its correctional institutions and detention facilities. Costs have soared, prisoners are coming out worse
off than when they went in, and while they are in they are
kept in conditions that shock the conscience, if not the
stomach.
1. See, e.g., Burger, The High Cost of Prison Tuition, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 903,
909 (1986) (article by Retired ChiefJustice Warren E. Burger).
2. See, e.g., Bacas, When Prisons and Profits Go Together, NATION'S Bus., Oct.
1984, at 62; Castro, Public Service, Private Profits, TIME, Feb. 10, 1986, at 64; Kroll,
PrisonsforProfit, THE PROGRESSIVE, Sept. 1984, at 18; Logan & Rausch, Punish and
Profit: The Emergence of Private Enterprise Prisons, 2 JUST. Q. 303 (1985).
3. Keynote address by Warren E. Burger, National Conference on "Factories
with Fences": The Prison Industries Approach to Correctional Dilemmas (June
18, 1984), reprinted in PRISONERS AND THE LAW ch. 21 (1.Robbins ed. 1985).

1988]

PRIVATE PRISON DELEGATION

913

The private sector, advocates claim, can save the taxpayers money. It can build facilities faster and cheaper, and it
can operate them more economically and more efficiently.
With maximum flexibility and little or no bureaucracy, new
ideas (like testing new philosophies) and routine matters
(like hiring new staff) can be implemented quickly. Overcrowding-perhaps the major systemic problem facing corrections today-can be reduced. A further anticipated
benefit of privatization is decreased liability of the government in suits that are brought by inmates and prison
employees.
The critics respond on many fronts. They claim, for example, that it is inappropriate to operate prisons with a
profit motive, which provides no incentive to reduce prison
populations (especially if the company is paid on a per-prisoner basis), nor to consider alternatives to incarceration, nor
to deal with the broader problems of criminal justice. On
the contrary, critics claim that the incentive would be to
build more prisons andjails. And if they are built, we will fill
them. This is a fact of correctional life: the number of incarcerated criminals has always risen to fill whatever space is
available.
Moreover, opponents argue that private prison corporations will be drawn to cost-cutting measures that will have
adverse effects on the prison system. As a reporter for Barron's has written, "the brokers, architects, builders and banks
...will make out like bandits." 4 But questions concerning
people's freedom should not be contracted out to the lowest
bidder. In short, the private sector is more interested in doing well than in doing good. 5
Prison privatization also raises concerns about the state
action liability of the private contractor as well as the routine, quasi-judicial decisions, such as recommendations to
parole boards and use of force, that affect the legal status
6
and well-being of the inmates.
4. Duffy, Breaking Into Jail, BARRON'S, May 14, 1984, at 20, 22.
5. This idea was succinctly expressed by the director of program development of Triad America Corporation, a multimillion-dollar Utah-based company
that was considering proposing a privately run county jail in Missoula, Montana:
"We'll hopefully make a buck at it. I'm not going to kid any of you and say we are
in this for humanitarian reasons." Deseret NewsJune 20-21, 1985, at B7 (statement ofJack Lyman).
6. See, e.g., infra note Ill.
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All of the above issues and concerns are important.
Before any of these questions come into play, however, one
threshold question must first be addressed: Is it constitutional, under both federal and state constitutions, to delegate the incarceration function to private corporations?
This question alone is the subject of this Article.
Since prison privatization is an issue at both the federal
and state levels, it is necessary to discuss the development of
the delegation doctrine at both levels. This discussion, however, necessarily involves different approaches because development of the doctrine itself has differed markedly in
federal and state courts. The doctrine has suffered from lack
of attention and use at the federal level, while state courts
continue actively to review private delegation. At the federal
level, the Supreme Court has not invalidated legislation on
delegation grounds since 1936, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.7
Federal courts have accepted, often without comment, delegation of federal power to private actors.8 In 1974, Justice
Marshall wrote that the doctrine "has been virtually abandoned by the Court for all practical purposes." 9 Although
several recent concurring and dissenting opinions may
prove this comment to have been a bit premature, it is clear
that doctrinal development at the federal level has been
hampered by disuse.
In addition, fundamental differences between federal
and state due process approaches, the constitutional source
for limitations on private delegation, account for differences
in the development and application of the doctrine. Federal
courts face considerations of judicial economy, federalism,
and institutional constraints that do not present particular
concern to many state courts.' 0
Part I of this Article discusses the likely impact that the
federal delegation doctrine would have on an attempt to
privatize federal prisons. Part II discusses similar issues with
regard to state delegation doctrines. These sections explain
the oversight and review functions that the governmental
7. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
8. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 648
(1986).
9. FPC v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974) (Marshall,
J., concurring).
10. See Lawrence, supra note 8, at 672-75.
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entity must perform over private prison companies. Additionally, they note the activities that the government cannot
delegate to the private prison and conclude that the principles announced in current delegation law may allow government to delegate prison management to a private company if
the government properly oversees, reviews, and circumscribes the private company's authority. The Article notes,
however, that, because incarceration of prisoners implicates
the life and liberty interests of the persons who are detained,
courts might not apply the delegation principles announced
in extant delegation cases, since only property interests generally were at issue in those cases. Thus, the question is an
extremely close one, and it would not be surprising if a court
were to rule against constitutionality.
I.

A.

FEDERAL DELEGATION

Brief History

Although the Constitution does not explicitly state that
Congress may not delegate its powers to others, the
Supreme Court has asserted the principle that Congress may
not delegate its powers to other branches of the government" or to private parties.' 2 Roots of the doctrine are
found both in article I of the Constitution, which states that
"[aill legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States,"' 3 and the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.' 4 As Justice
Brandeis pointed out, the two concepts are related: "The
doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the
Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power."' 5 The constitutional
limits on executive power serve to prevent arbitrary executive action under the conviction that the people must look to
representative bodies and courts to protect their liberties.
Protection of the individual from the arbitrary and capricious exercise of power, by an official body or a private party
11.

Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (dictum).
12. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936).
13. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § I.
14. See Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 83-84 (1902) (rejecting argument that
state government improperly delegated judicial power to executive parole board
and upholding delegation on fourteenth amendment due process grounds).
15. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J.,dissenting).
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acting under delegated authority, is an essential element of
free government. Thus, the underlying purpose of the delegation doctrine should be to provide needed protection
against uncontrolled discretionary power. 16 The Supreme
Court generally has used an article I separation of powers
argument when considering delegation to an agency or
other public body. When considering delegations to private
parties, however, the Court has employed a due process
analysis.
1. Delegation to Public Bodies
; Although it frequently asserts the nondelegation principle, the Supreme Court almost always sustains the constitutionality of challenged delegations.17 In doing so, the Court
has taken various approaches to accommodate increasingly
broad congressional delegations.' 8 Although in its early
stages the delegation doctrine required Congress to legislate
"as far as was reasonably practicable,"' 19 the doctrine now
requires only that Congress state an "intelligible principle" 20 when it delegates legislative power.
Field v. Clark2 was one of the early Supreme Court cases
to discuss the delegation doctrine. Congress had empowered the President to raise tariff schedules and suspend
trade with a foreign country if he determined that a duty imposed by the foreign country on American products was "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable." 22 This delegation
was challenged on the ground that it delegated the power to
tax; it was upheld, however, on the theory that the President
"was the mere agent of the law-making department" and his
only role was. to ascertain a fact. 23
The principle announced in Field, that Congress constitutionally may delegate a fact-finding function, was reiter16.

1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE

LAw TREATISE § 3.2, at 150 (2d ed. 1978).

17. Freedman, Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. CIHI. L. REV.
307, 307 (1976).
18. Comment, The Fourth Branch: Reviving the Nondelegation Doctrine, 1984
B.Y.U. L. REV. 619, 621-30.
19. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904).
20. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
21. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
22. Id. at 693.
23. Id.
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ated in Buttfield v. Stranahan.24 In Buttfield, Congress
delegated authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to pro2 5
hibit the importation of impure and unwholesome tea.
The Supreme Court observed that the duty of the government experts who examined the tea was to ascertain whether
26
such conditions existed that conferred a right to import.
Citing Field, the Court held that the statute did not confer
legislative power on administrative officials, and added that
"Congress legislated on the subject as far as was reasonably
27
practicable."
Within twenty years, the Court retreated to a less stringent standard. In United States v. Grimaud,28 the Court
citedField's prohibitory language against delegation, but deflated its meaning by stating that "the authority to make administrative rules is not a delegation of legislative power." 29
A further retreat in the Grimaud case involved the shift to
permitting delegation if it was accompanied by an "adequate
30
standard."
InJ. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States,3 1 the Supreme
Court changed its "adequate standard" test to require Congress to establish "intelligible principles.- 32 The Court upheld delegation of authority to the President to audit tariffs
to equalize differences between costs of goods produced do33
mestically and those produced by foreign competitors.
The Act also established certain guidelines for determining
trade imbalances and fixing limits of exchange, and made investigation by the Tariff Commission a prerequisite to
changing duties. 3 4 The Court stated that, "[i]f Congress
24. 192 U.S. 470 (1904).
25. Id. at 471-72 n.l.
26. Id. at 497.
27. Id. at 496.
28. 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
29. Id. at 521.
30. Id. at 515-16; see also Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364,
384-85 (1907) (holding that Congress cannot delegate any part of its legislative
power except under the limitation of a prescribed standard); cf. United States v.
Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 282 U.S. 311, 324 (1931) (asserting that an Interstate Commerce Commission rule was a proper exercise of delegated authority
only if it was warranted by statutory standards that defined the delegated
authority).
31. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
32. Id. at 409.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 400-02.
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shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to
which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden
3
delegation of legislative power."-

5

The Supreme Court has invalidated Congress's delega-,
tion of authority on article I grounds on only two occasions,
both occurring during the New Deal era of the 1930s.
Although the Court has never expressly overruled either
case, the cases are probably aberrations, because the Court
has never relied seriously on either case to analyze delega36
tion issues. In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
the Court struck down a section of the National Industrial
Recovery Act (NIRA) authorizing the President to establish
"codes of fair competition" for a virtually unlimited number
of industries and trades. 3 7 Section 3 of the Act gave the

President power to approve detailed codes on his own initiative or on application by the industries or trade associations
that were affected. 38 The Court focused on the absence of

standards or restrictions as well as on the scope of the delegated powers and the discretion granted to the President.
Justice Cardozo termed the statute "delegation running
riot," amounting to a complete transfer of Congress's power
39
under the Commerce Clause.

In contrast, the Court in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan 40
dealt with a different section of the NIRA that seemed more
35. Id. at 409; see also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944) (applying intelligible principle test to uphold constitutionality of Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737,
745-46 (D.D.C. 1971) (upholding Economic Stabilization Act of 1971 against delegation challenge) (citing Yakus, 321 U.S. at 424).
36. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
37. Id. at 521-22.
38. Id. at 521-23. The Court summarized its discussion of Section 3 by
stating:
It supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does
not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the
making of codes to prescribe them. For that legislative undertaking,
§ 3 sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the general
aims of rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in section

one.
Id. at 541.
39. Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
40. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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in line with legislation that the Court had previously upheld.
It authorized the President to restrict the interstate transportation of petroleum produced in excess of the amount
permitted by state law. 4 ' The Court found no adequate cri-

teria to control the President's authority. General policy
statements admonishing the President "to remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce
which tend to diminish the amount thereof," "eliminate unfair competitive practices," and "conserve natural re42
sources" were declared to be inadequate principles.
2.

Delegation to Private Parties

Although the Supreme Court has held delegations to
private parties to be unconstitutional on delegation grounds
several times during this century, 43 the vast majority of
Court cases have upheld such delegations as constitutionally
valid. 4 4 In fact, the Supreme Court has not invalidated a pri-

vate delegation since the New Deal era case of Carterv. Carter
41. Id. at 406-07.
42. Id. at 417.
43. See Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116,
122 (1928) (invalidating ordinance that prohibited philanthropic home for the
aged in zoning district without consent of designated portion of neighbors);
Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 144 (1912) (invalidating statute that
delegated the power to determine how far buildings were to be set back from the
street to two-thirds of certain property owners).
44. See, e.g., Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 397-98
(1940) (holding that Bituminous Coal Act did not unconstitutionally delegate to
National Bituminous Coal Commission the power to fix prices because statutory
standard that guided Commission was sufficiently specific); United States v. Rock
Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533, 577-78 (1939) (upholding against delegation challenge statute providing that administrative determination concerning milk price
was not effective unless two-thirds of area milk producers approved price); Currin
v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1939) (reasoning that statute conditioning tobacco
inspection requirements on votes of two-thirds of affected tobacco producers did
not unlawfully delegate legislative power to those producers, but rather was a condition that Congress permissibly could place on operation of its own statute); Old
Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 193-94 (1936)
(holding that Illinois fair trade law forbidding retailers to sell product below resale price, fixed in contract with other producers, did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to those other retailers because producer's interest in
protecting value of its goodwill in trademark or brand name was itself a property
interest that the state could legitimately protect); Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of
Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 531 (1917) (reasoning that statute permitting one-half of
property owners to remove zoning restriction on property was not unconstitutional delegation because statute merely allowed property owners to remove existing restrictions rather than impose new ones); Butte City Water Co. v. Baker,
196 U.S. 119, 126-27 (1905) (upholding against delegation challenge statute giv-
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Coal Co. ,45 in which a federal statute making maximum hours
and minimum wages agreed on by a majority of miners and
producers binding on the remainder was held invalid. The
Court in Carter Coal stated:
This is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form;
for it is not even delegation to an official or an official
body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons
whose interests may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same business ....

And a statute

which attempts to confer such power undertakes an intolerable and unconstitutional 46interference with personal
liberty and private property.
The ban on delegation was based on fifth amendment due
process grounds. The choice of due process rather than
separation of powers doctrine might suggest that article I
imposes no per se ban on federal delegations to private parties 4 7 and that they are to be judged by more flexible due
process criteria. Carter also may suggest that whatever constitutional restrictions do exist may apply equally to the
states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment, a result that
would not be reached if the prohibition found its source in
article I. 48 (It is important to note, however, that, whatever
the federal practice, state courts continue to actively review
private delegations.49 ) The delegation cases that followed
ing legal effect to rules that miners had developed concerning whether, and in

what circumstances, property rights in mining claim vest).
45.

298 U.S. 238 (1936).

46. Id. at 311.
47. See Lawrence, supra note 8, at 665-66. Lawrence explained that
[s]eparation of powers may have some relevance to delegations of
legislative power to executive agencies, in that one department
might then in fact be exercising the power of another, but a private
delegation does not cross the lines between departments. It has
been argued that the purpose of the separation-of-powers requirement is to protect individual liberty, in that dispersing power among
several agents prevents a liberty-endangering concentration of
power in one or a few hands. If that view is correct, then private
delegations serve the same goal because power is spread still further. One need not carry the argument that far, however, to see that
the separation-of-powers principle is a weak foundation for limiting
private delegations.
Id. (footnote omitted).
48. Liebmann, Delegation to Private Partiesin American ConstitutionalLaw, 50 IND.

L.J. 650, 664 (1975).
49. See Lawrence, supra note 8, at 675. Lawrence stated that
the doctrinal development of federal due process may be affected by
considerations of judicial economy, federalism, and institutional
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Carter all upheld increasingly broad private delegations without ever questioning Carter's holding that Congress could
50
not delegate legislative power to private parties.
Commentators generally agree that the Supreme Court
has not stated a satisfactory theory of the principles governing the delegation doctrine and has failed to articulate a
precise test to distinguish between statutes that properly
delegate and those that do not.5 ' Although there is some

indication of renewed interest in the doctrine in dissenting
and concurring opinions, 52 not since 1948 has any opinion
for the Court's majority even attempted to deal in a substantial manner with the delegation doctrine. Consequently, it is
difficult to predict how the Court would treat delegation in
the private prison context. The Supreme Court has often
decided cases that could have turned on delegation issues on
other grounds and avoided the issue altogether, or has
treated it only in passing. 53 For example, the Court chose to
decide several cases on state action grounds even though it
54
could have ruled on delegation grounds.
constraints that do not so strongly affect the state courts. In addition, the election of state courts, the nature of state constitutions,
and the methods of state legislatures combine to make it more tenable for a state court to overturn legislative decisions.
Id.
50. See supra note 44 (listing, inter alia, post-Carter delegation cases upheld by
the Supreme Court).
51. For commentary criticizing the Court's failure to develop and consistently
apply rational principles to delegation cases, see, e.g., 1 K. DAvis, supra note 16,
§ 3.12, at 193; Liebmann, supra note 48, at 664; Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1289 (1985); Comment, supra note 18, at 620.
52. See infra notes 85-100 and accompanying text.
53. See Schoenbrod, supra note 51, at 1232-33 (arguing that recent Supreme
Court cases that have narrowed or invalidated statutes on vagueness or due process grounds have avoided explication of delegation doctrine); cf. Liebmann, supra
note 48, at 653-54 (observing that the distinction between deprivation of due process and equal protection, on the one hand, and unlawful delegation, on the other
hand, is often obscure).
54. See Liebmann, supra note 48, at 654 n.16 (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972) and Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)). Liebmann argued that
if courts are willing to find state action under such circumstances,
definite parallels to the former abuses of the delegation doctrine exist. It may not be too much to say that the due process and equal
protection clauses have in recent years been doing some of the work
formerly done by the delegation doctrine.
Id. But see Schneider, The 1982 State Action Trilogy: Doctrinal Contraction, Confusion,
and a Proposalfor Change, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1150, 1152 (1985) (observing
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Current Federal Law

While there are no recent Supreme Court cases that
have turned on the delegation doctrine, current federal law
that is most analogous to the private prison context is found
in opinions upholding the Maloney Act, 55 which authorizes
self-regulation of the securities industry against challenges
that the Act unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to
a private institution. The Act provides for promulgation of
rules by a dealer association and disciplinary proceedings
against its members.5 6 Under the statute, disciplinary rules
must require specific charges, a hearing of record, and a
statement of the findings. 57 In addition, if an association
member is disciplined, it has the right to appeal to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which in turn decides whether the petitioner committed the charged acts and
whether those acts violated the association's rules.5 8 The
SEC may then reduce, cancel, or leave undisturbed the pen9
alty that was imposed.5
In R.H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC,60 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit found no merit in a constitutional challenge to the delegation. The court summarily
dismissed the challenge, noting that the SEC, a fully public
body, has the power, according to reasonably fixed statutory
standards, to approve or disapprove of the asso ciation's
6
rules and to review any disciplinary action. '
1. The Todd Test
The test for measuring the constitutionality of the dele62
gation was stated more specifically in Todd and Co. v. SEC.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that the Maloney Act did not unconstitutionally delethat in recent years the Supreme Court has been moving toward a restrictive state
action doctrine). See generally infra note 111 (discussing state action doctrine in the
private prison context).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1982).
56. Id. § 78o-3(b).
57. Id. § 78o-3(h).
58. Id. § 78o-3(h)(3).
59. Id.
60. 198 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1952).
61. Id. at 695.
62. 557 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1977).
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gate governmental power to private securities associations. 63
In so holding, the court articulated a three-pronged test. 64
First, following R.H. Johnson & Co., the SEC must have the
65
power to approve or disapprove of the association's rules.
Second, in any disciplinary proceeding, the SEC must make
de novo findings aided by additional evidence, if necessary. 6 6 Third, the SEC must make an independent decision
on the violation and the penalty. 6 7 Another part of the Todd
opinion held that the Board of Governors of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (N.A.S.D.) erred in reinstating a dropped charge without notice of its intention to
do so. 6 8 The court chastised the SEC for failing to insist on
meticulous compliance with N.A.S.D. appellate procedure. 6 9
As a consequence, the SEC order was vacated and remanded
70
with instructions that the proper procedure be followed.
The decision thus emphasized the close link between the
7
delegation doctrine and due process concerns. '
The Todd test suggests that the constitutionality of the
delegation in the private prison context would turn on the
structure under which the delegation occurred. If a corrections agency promulgated rules of prison administration in
the first instance, then the delegation would satisfy the first
prong of the Todd test because the public body, not the private party, is responsible for the rule-making process. If the
63. Id. at 1012.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. But cf. First Jersey Sec. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690, 697 (3d Cir. 1979)
(holding that amendment to Maloney Act was constitutional even though it restricted the SEC's ability to receive additional evidence), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074
(1980).
67. 557 F.2d at 1012.
68. Id. at 1014.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1015.
71. The court reasoned that, because the SEC was
[c]harged with making independent decisions and its own interpretations of the N.A.S.D.'s rules, the Commission must insure fair
treatment of those disciplined by the Association....
Since it is a
departure from the traditional governmental exercise of enforcement power in the first instance, confidence in the impartiality and
fairness of the Association's procedures must be maintained. The
S.E.C., therefore, should not cavalierly dismiss procedural errors affecting the rights of those subjected to sanctions but should insist
upon meticulous compliance by the private organization.
Id. at 1014.
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private company had rule-making power, however, then the
corrections agency, an independent public body, must have
authority to approve or disapprove of those rules according
to reasonably fixed standards. The second and third prongs
of the Todd test concern disciplinary proceedings. This aspect is of particular concern in the private prison context because these proceedings may affect the length of a prisoner's
confinement, his eligibility for parole, or his loss of goodtime credits. Under the second prong of the test, the corrections agency must make de novo findings. Under the third
prong, the agency must make an independent decision on
the violation and the penalty. Whether a delegation would
satisfy the second and third prongs depends initially on who
has control over disciplinary proceedings. If the private
company maintained control over such proceedings, then
the corrections agency must make de novo findings and an
independent decision on the violation and the penalty.
A recent article suggests that, to avoid legal challenge, it
might be preferable for the state to maintain control over all
disciplinary proceedings. 72 In this situation, where the private company is confined to a primarily administrative role,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in
Crain v. First NationalBank, 7 3 suggested a minimal delegation
problem. Crain dealt with provisions of the Klamath Termination Act, which provides that Indians who are determined
to be in need of assistance may place their funds in private
trusts. 7 4 Pursuant to provisions of the Act, the Secretary of
the Interior made individual determinations that certain
members of the Klamath Indian tribe were in need of assistance in conducting their affairs and placed appellants' funds
in private trusts that the bank administered. The court held
that the Act did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative
power to a private corporation. In support of its holding,
the court cited Berman v. Parker,75 a 1954 Supreme Court
case that distinguished between the power to enact laws and
authority or discretion concerning their execution. 76 The
72. Mayer, Legal Issues SurroundingPrivateOperation of Prisons,22 CRIM. L. BULL.
309, 320 (1986).
73. 324 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1963).

74. Id. at 533.
75. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
76. Crain, 324 F.2d at 537.
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court stated: "While Congress cannot delegate to private
corporations or anyone else the power to enact laws, it may
employ them in an administrative capacity to carry them into
effect." 77 Additionally, the court observed that Congress had
detailed the proper objectives, goals, and methods of carry78
ing out such management.

Again, when applied in the private prison context,
Berman suggests that courts would uphold delegations to private prison companies because the private corporation was
employed not to enact laws but to carry them into effect in
an administrative capacity. The extent to which this case is
fully analogous to the private prison context, however, depends on who makes the initial determination to discipline
the prisoner. In Crain, the Secretary of the Interior had
made the initial determination. An employee of the private
company, however, might make the initial determination to
discipline a prisoner.
2.

Possible Inapplicability of the Todd Test

It is important to note that all of the aforementioned
cases dealt with property interests. Therefore, courts rhight
not apply the reasoning of these cases to the private prison
context because a private prison affects the prisoner's liberty
interests. In Kent v. Duties,79 the Supreme Court suggested
that it would apply a more stringent standard when it analyzed the constitutionality of delegations in cases affecting a
liberty interest.8 0 The Court in Kent construed a statute that
granted broad discretion to deny passports. 8 ' The Court
held that, if "activities or enjoyment, natural and often necessary to the well-being of an American citizen, such as
travel, are involved, we will construe narrowly all delegated
powers that curtail or dilute them."-8 2 The opinion did not
77. Id.
78. Id. But see Republic Indus., Inc. v. Central Pa. Teamsters Pension Fund,
693 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1982) (striking down a delegation to a private arbitrator of
power to adjudicate rights of employers in multi-employer pension fund).

79. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
80. Id. at 129.
81. Id.
82. Id.; cf. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 275 (1967) (Brennan,J., concurring) (asserting that "numerous deficiencies connected with vague legislative
directives . . . are far more serious when liberty and the exercise of fundamental
rights are at stake").
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identify these rights, but commentators generally have understood these standards to apply to statutes involving "protected freedoms," as opposed to statutes that regulate
83
property.
C. Possible Trend to Revive the Delegation Doctrine
As stated earlier, no Supreme Court majority opinion
since 1948 has even attempted to deal in a substantial manner with the delegation doctrine.8 4 A number of dissents
and concurrences, however, have argued forcefully for one
side or the other.8 5 Moreover, two opinions by Justice Rehnquist may signify that the doctrine is not entirely dead,
although their line of reasoning is not directly applicable to
private delegations. 86

Justice Brennan wrote a well-considered analysis of the
delegation doctrine in a dissenting opinion in the 1971 case,
McGautha v. California,87 which upheld a California statute allowing the jury to fix the death penalty without guidelines.
Three Justices would have invalidated the statute on delegation grounds. After sketching the history of the delegation
doctrine, Justice Brennan outlined three legislative techniques that Congress has used to "assure that policy is set in
accordance with congressional desires and that individuals
are treated according to uniform principles rather than administrative whim." 88 He noted, first, that Congress has undertaken to regulate even rather complex questions by the
prescription of relatively specific standards.89 Second, Justice Brennan noted that Congress has at times granted to
others the power to prescribe fixed rules to govern future
activity and adjudication. °0 Third, he noted that the most
common legislative technique for dealing with complex
83. Schoenbrod, supra note 51, at 1232.
84. See FPC v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) (the delegation doctrine "has been virtually abandoned by
the Court for all practical purposes" except where personal liberties are
involved).
85. Schoenbrod, supra note 51, at 1233.
86. See infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text (discussing recent Supreme
Court opinions in which Justice Rehnquist wrote separately on delegation
grounds).
87. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
88. Id. at 275 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 276.
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questions has been delegation to another group of lawmaking power that the group may exercise either through rulemaking or the adjudication of individual cases, with a choice
between the two methods left to the agency's judgment. 9 '
Justice Brennan then concluded that there was nothing inherent in the nature of capital punishment that made impossible the application of any or all of these means to check
arbitrary action, but that the two state procedures under review failed to provide the necessary safeguards. 92
Justice Brennan's opinion in McGautha involved a delegation of judicial sentencing power to a private group, the
jury. A 1980 opinion by Justice Rehnquist, however, discussed the delegation doctrine in a case involving a delegation to a governmental agency. In Industrial Union Department
v. American Petroleum Institute (the Benzene case), 93 five Justices
voted to overturn an action taken under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act. Four Justices reached this result by
narrowly construing the Act to avoid an unconstitutionally
broad delegation. 94 Justice Rehnquist, the fifth vote, asserted that the congressional delegation itself was unconstitutional because it was ambiguous and violated the
delegation doctrine. 95 He argued that the delegation doctrine serves three important functions. 96 First, "it ensures to
the extent consistent with orderly governmental administration that important [social policy choices] are made by Congress."-9 7 Second, it guarantees that the recipient of the
91. Id. at 278.
92. Id. at 280, 287. For other cases that discussed the delegation doctrine, see
National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-42 (1974)
(construing narrowly a statute that authorized the FCC to set licensing fees to
avoid the possibility that the statute unconstitutionally delegated the power to
tax); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 625-26 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in
part) (arguing that a statute that delegated power to the Secretary of Interior to
allocate waters from the Colorado River system was unconstitutional because the
statute lacked standards to guide the Secretary's discretion).
Justice Harlan's dissent in Arizona discussed two purposes for the delegation
doctrine that he believed were not furthered by the statute at issue. First, he
stated that the delegation doctrine ensures that the elected body that is immediately responsible to the people will make fundamental policy decisions. Id. at 626.
Second, Justice Harlan asserted that the delegation doctrine provides a statutory
standard against which the courts can review a challenged official action. Id.
93. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
94. Id. at 607-71 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart & Powell, JJ.).
95. Id. at 685-86 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 685.
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authority is provided "with an 'intelligible principle' to
guide the exercise of the delegated discretion." 98 Third, the
doctrine enables "courts charged with reviewing the exercise of delegated legislative discretion ...

to test that exer-

cise against ascertainable standards. ' 99 Justice Rehnquist
believed that the legislation at issue failed on all three
counts.100
Justice Rehnquist's logic in the Benzene case is not directly applicable to the private prison context, because the
case dealt with a congressional delegation to a public agency
rather than to a private party. Justice Rehnquist's concern
centered on delegation of congressional responsibility for
deciding major social policy. A delegation to a private
prison company that had adequate statutory guidelines does
not involve the same issues.
At least one commentator' 0 ' has viewed Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Benzene as consistent with the Court's decision in Immigration and NaturalizationService v. Chadha. 0 2 The
Court in Chadha invalidated the legislative veto provision in
an immigration statute on the theory that the provision improperly delegated legislative power because it violated article I separation of powers requirements. 103 The Court
approved the delegation to the Attorney General of authority to waive deportation because the Attorney General was
bound by an articulated principle that could be applied in a
consistent manner. 0 4 The Court, however, rejected the further delegation of uncontrolled decision-making discretion
to one house of the legislature. 0 5
The Supreme Court used a formalistic and structural argument, turning on express constitutional requirements of
bicameral passage and congressional presentment of the
98. Id. at 685-86.
99. Id. at 686.
100. Id.; see also American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543,
547-48 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 at issue in Industrial Union Department, unconstitutionally delegated to Secretary of Labor the policy choice of whether, and to what extent, costbenefit analysis should determine industrial safety standards) (citing Industrial
Union Dep', 448 U.S. at 671 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
101. See Schoenbrod, supra note 51, at 1235.
102. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
103. Id. at 954.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 958-59.
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legislation to the President for signature into law. In striking down the legislation, the Court demanded that each
branch of government exercise its constitutional responsibilities. The Court's focus, however, was abdication of constitutional functions to another branch of government, and not
to a private party.
Justice White's dissent suggested that delegation to a
private group, contingent on some fixed statutory standard,
was not overruled and that the previous doctrine survived.10 6 But commentators have suggested that Chadha will
effect "a significant judicial tightening of the limits within
which Congress may entrust anyone with lawmaking
power,"' 1 7 and that Chadha will encourage Congress to delegate less with better policy standards when it does delegate. 10 8 Thus, although the analysis in Chadha does not
apply directly to delegations to private prison companies,
Chadha may encourage Congress to make delegations under
stricter statutory standards.
In summary, although no Supreme Court majority has
attempted to deal in a substantial manner with the delegation doctrine since 1948, there have been several important
dissenting and concurring opinions. A consideration of
these opinions leads one to conclude that courts might apply
a more stringent standard of review to delegations that affect
liberty interests than they do to those that affect property
interests.
II.

STATE DELEGATION OF THE INCARCERATION FUNCTION

Although some commentators regard state delegation
cases as unprincipled, 0 9 for the purpose of analysis, this sec106. Id. at 967-1013 (White, J., dissenting); see also supra note 44.
107. Tribe, The Legislative Ieto Decision: A Law by Any Other Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 1, 17 (1984) (emphasis in original).
108. Comment, supra note 18, at 621.
109. See, e.g.,
I K. DAvis, supra note 16, § 3.12, at 196 ("The first edition of the
Treatise and the 1970 Supplement elaborately presented the state law concerning
delegation to private parties, but retention of that material in the present edition,
along with the updating of it, seems undesirable, because identifiable principles
do not emerge."); Lawrence, supra note 8, at 647 (noting that cases on delegation
are inconsistent both within and among the states); see also D. MANDELKER, D.
NETSCH & P. SALSICH, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 598
(2d ed. 1983). Mandelker, Netsch, and Salsich concluded that
[tihe nondelegation doctrine is alive and well in the state courts.
Delegation of power objections are frequently made to state and lo-
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tion of the Article divides state delegation cases into three
categories. Subsection A discusses cases upholding statutes
that delegate the management of government programs to
private persons. The private parties in these cases had
neither rule-making nor adjudicative powers, but merely
managed government programs within the parameters established by either the legislature or an administrative
agency. Subsection B discusses the issue of whether, and in
what circumstances, states may delegate rule-making functions to private parties. Subsection C discusses the circumstances in which a state may allow a private party to
adjudicate the rights of others and whether judicial review of
private adjudication is necessary.
As each of these classes of cases is discussed, this section compares the factual differences between the cases discussed and the private prison context. This section then
explores the issue of whether a court would actually apply
the principles announced in these cases to the private prison
context. The section concludes that the principles announced in existing case law may permit states to contract
with private companies for the incarceration of its prisoners.
The state, though, must retain certain rule-making and adjudicative functions.
It is crucial to note, however, that the factual and philosophical differences between the private prison context and
the cases discussed may well motivate a court to hold that a
statute authorizing a state to contract with a private company to incarcerate its prisoners is unconstitutional.
A.

Delegation of Management Functions

The constitutionality of privatization focuses, in the first
instance, on whether a particular activity in which the government is involved is a governmental power, rather than a
governmental function. If the privatization at issue involves
cal legislation, although a review of the state cases indicates that
most delegations are upheld. State delegation cases are common
but the decisions are unprincipled. Except for the conclusion that
some state courts more frequently invalidate delegations of power
than others, a principled basis for the application of the delegation
of power doctrine is difficult to find.
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the former, a delegation issue arises.I t1 A private entity exercises governmental power when it deprives a person of
life, liberty, or property at the behest of government."'
110. See Lawrence, supra note 8, at 647. Professor Lawrence stated:
Much of the debate over privatization has been political in nature,
rather than legal; and indeed when privatization involves governmentalfunctions, the legal issues are largely secondary, involving only
details. But if privatization proposals should involve governmental
powers, the legal problems become considerably more formidable.
The transfer of governmental powers raises the issue of to what extent it is constitutionally permissible to delegate those powers to private actors.
Id. (emphasis in original). An early New York Court of Appeals case explained
differently this distinction between governmental functions and powers. In Fox v.
Mohawk & Hudson River Humane Soc'y, 165 N.Y. 517, 59 N.E. 353 (1901),Judge
Cullen wrote:
I certainly should deny the right of the legislature to vest in private
associations or corporations authority and power affecting the life,
liberty, and property of the citizens .... Of course, the state... may
employ individuals or corporations to do work or render service for
it, but the distinction between a public officer and a public employee
or contractor is plain and well recognized.
Id. at 525, 59 N.E. at 355. Thus, if the government gives a private.party power to
affect a person's life, liberty, or property interest, it is delegating governmental
power. If, however, the government merely contracts with a private party to confer a benefit on members of the public that does not affect any person's existing
life, liberty, or property interest, it has not delegated its governmental power.
Therefore, a contract to provide food or medical care to prisoners in an institution that the state owns and controls does not in itself raise a constitutional issue.
A prisoner has no interest in receiving his food or medical care directly from the
government rather than from an independent contractor. If, however, the government leaves the entire operation of the prison in private hands, it is the private
company, and not the government, that is immediately responsible for the prisoner's day-to-day deprivation of liberty.
For a critique of the "government functions" approach in a different context,
see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 538-47 (1985)
(holding that transit authority was not immune from minimum wage and overtime
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
11. If the government gives a private party the authority to deprive another of
life, liberty, or property, the issue of state action arises. If a private actor exercises
governmental power, the state nevertheless retains the responsibility to protect
the constitutional rights of those persons over whom the private company exercises control. Schneider, supra note 54, at 1169-70. Thus, "[allthough the state
may have a private actor performing the service ....

the nondelegable nature of

the service means that the state must remain responsible for the performance of
that service." Id. at 1170. Stated another way, the government can delegate the
function, but not the duty to perform that function. Compare Ancata v. Prison
Health Servs., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11 th Cir. 1985) ("Although Prison Health Services and its employees are not strictly speaking public employees, state action is
clearly present. Where a function which is traditionally the exclusive prerogative
of the state . . . is performed by a private entity, state action is present.") with

West v. Atkins, 815 F.2d 993, 994-96 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (7-3 vote) (declin-
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Thus, a delegation can occur even though the private party
exercises neither rule-making nor adjudicative powers but
merely manages a government program that is already in
place.
The first category of delegations, therefore, is the delegation of the management of government property and programs. In People v. Chicago Railroad Terminal Authority,"

2

for

example, the validity of a statute permitting railroad terminal authorities to contract with private companies to maintain and operate the authorities' terminals was attacked on
delegation grounds.' 3 The statute reserved ultimate power
over the terminal's management to the Authority," 4 and authorized the railroad terminal authorities to delegate administrative duties to railroad companies. " 5 The court held that
this delegation was constitutional." 6
Chicago Railroad established the proposition that, under
the Illinois Constitution, a governmental body can constitutionally delegate the management of a government enterprise to a private company if the governmental body retains
ultimate control over the program. Significantly, the statute
ing to overrule Calvert v. Sharp, 748 F.2d 861 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.

1132 (1985), in which the court held that a physician who had contracted with the
state to furnish medical services in prison was not acting under color of state law
when he allegedly provided inadequate medical treatment to prisoner), cert.
granted, 108 S. Ct. 256 (1987). Noting the overlap between the state action and
delegation analyses, the court in Ancata stated:
The federal courts have consistently ruled that governments, state
and local, have an obligation to provide medical care to incarcerated
individuals. .

.

. This duty is not absolved by contracting with an

entity such as Prison Health Services. Although Prison Health Services has contracted to perform an obligation owed by the county, the
county itself remains liable for any constitutional deprivations
caused by the policies or customs of the Health Service. In that
sense, the county's duty is non-delegable.
769 F.2d at 705 (footnote omitted).
Even if a state action problem does not exist under current law, the validity of
the delegation still depends, in part, on whether the private actor performs its
duty in a constitutional manner. See Lawrence, supra note 8, at 693 (even if state
action is not present, if the private party makes decisions regarding the life, liberty, or property of citizens at the behest of the government, courts may find delegation improper unless the private actor creates and follows a program that
satisfies principles of procedural due process).
112. 14Ill. 2d 230, 151 N.E.2d 311 (1958).
113. Id. at 238-40, 151 N.E.2d at 316-17.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 239-40, 151 N.E.2d at 317.

116. Id. at 242, 151 N.E.2d at 318.
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challenged in Chicago Railroad did not permit private railroad
companies to choose the terminal sites or acquire the land
for the terminals." 17 Thus, the Terminal Authority, not the
railroad company, made the policy decision concerning terminal location and design, including the issue of whether,
and how many, shops to construct and lease. The statute at
issue permitted the Terminal Authority to vest the power to
supervise and control the construction, maintenance, and
operation of the terminal in a committee that was composed,
in part, of railroad company officials.' 1 8 Noting that the Terminal Authority retained ultimate control over the terminal,
the court held that the statute did not unconstitutionally allow the Authority to delegate its powers to private parties. 19
The statute did not, however, permit the Terminal Authority to delegate either rule-making or adjudicative powers
to private railroad companies. Rather, it reserved the adjudicative power of condemning land for terminal use to the
Terminal Authority itself. Although the statute permitted
the prerogative to delegate the authority to establish terminal management policy to a board consisting of private company appointees, the Authority retained ultimate control
over the board. Thus, because the Authority could accept,
reject, or modify the rules that the management committee
established, the rules were advisory. The board, therefore,
did not have rule-making power. Instead, the statute limited
the private delegate's power to the function of administering
a program that a governmental body established.
Nevertheless, because the statute permitted the Terminal Authority to yield physical control of terminal property
to a private company, a private delegate potentially could affect the property rights of terminal lessees. Therefore, the
statute in fact permitted a true delegation of governmental
power to affect private property interests for a public
purpose.
Statutes that permit private security guards to detain
suspected shoplifters present another example of administrative delegation. Although the statutes and relevant cases
117. See id. at 234, 240-41, 151 N.E.2d at 314, 317 (noting that the statute
required the Authority to select, and the city council to approve, the terminal site
and, once approved, the Authority had the power to acquire designated land).
118. Id. at 239-40, 151 N.E.2d at 316.
119. Id. at 238-40, 151 N.E.2d at 316-17.
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do not expressly discuss the delegation doctrine, they effectively authorize private persons to deprive people of their
liberty for the public purpose of enforcing criminal laws. An
Indiana statute, for example, authorizes private security
guards to detain suspected shoplifters if the guards have
probable cause to believe that the detainee has stolen any
item belonging to the store. 120 But this statute does not authorize store security guards to make arrests; 121 their power
is investigatory only.
Humane society officers perform law enforcement functions analogous to those of store security guards. In ASPCA
v. City of New York, ' 22 for example, a Humane Society officer
directed a police officer to a person whom the Society suspected had been cruel to a horse. 123 The police officer, however, actually arrested the suspect and prosecuted him
before a magistrate. 24 The Humane Society officers wore
special uniforms, patrolled the streets, and reported any suspected violations of the state's humane laws.' 2 5 The New
York Appellate Court characterized the Humane Society's
law enforcement activities as "purely administrative,"' 2 6 and
held that the state government constitutionally could delegate the law enforcement functions at issue to the Humane
Society.'

27

In both the store security guard and Humane Society
examples, the private officers had no authority either to
arrest suspects or to adjudicate crimes. The private officers'
only authority was to identify suspected lawbreakers and
facilitate their ultimate arrest and prosecution by govern120. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-33-6-1 to -5 (Burns 1985) (outlining circumstances in which store employee may detain suspected shoplifter). An Indiana
appellate court has upheld the constitutionality of the predecessor statute sub
silentio. Crase v. Highland Village Value Plus Pharmacy, 176 Ind. App. 47, 52,
374 N.E.2d 58, 62 (1978) (remanding case to determine whether "statutory defense" to false imprisonment action applied, without discussing Act's
constitutionality).
121. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-6-2(b) (Burns 1985) (limiting store security
guards' authority to detain suspected shoplifter temporarily until police can come
to make arrest).
122. 205 A.D. 335, 199 N.Y.S. 728 (1923).
123. Id. at 336, 199 N.Y.S. at 729.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 338, 199 N.Y.S. at 730.
126. Id. at 341, 199 N.Y.S. at 733.
127. Id. (citing Fox v. Mohawk & Hudson River Humane Soc'y, 165 N.Y. 517,
59 N.E. 353 (1901)).
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ment officials. In both instances, independent, governmental decision-makers ultimately decided whether to arrest,
prosecute, and sentence the wrongdoer. Thus, the private
companies performed only administrative, not adjudicative
functions. 128
Moreover, in each of these examples of administrative
delegation, the private party had neither rule-making nor
adjudicative powers and could merely assist a government
agency in implementing its policy decisions. The principles
announced in these cases, therefore, might allow private
prison management under rules that the state established. A
state agency with authority to accept, reject, or modify administrative rules that the private prison company proposed,
however, would have to review any proposed rule that would
affect the prisoners. Additionally, a state judicial or administrative officer would have to determine whether an individual prisoner had violated an administrative rule. This would
be necessary if the prisoner's incarceration were prolonged
29
as a result of such a determination.
Courts might not apply the principles established in the
cases discussed in this section to the private prison context,
however. The private delegates in these cases performed
functions that states commonly permit private parties to perform. Private citizens typically have the right to identify and
even arrest' 30 suspected lawbreakers. Private railroads certainly may construct and operate railroad terminals without
first seeking state approval. Hence, none of the delegates in
the cases discussed performed functions that were unique to
government.
128. See also Hogan v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 807, 811,228 P.2d 554, 556 (1951)
(rejecting challenge on delegation grounds to state bar association's authority to
recommend disciplinary action against attorney because recommendation was advisory and subject to de novo review in state supreme court),
129. This would occur, for example, if an administrative infraction resulted in a
loss of the prisoner's good-time credits or affected his chance for parole. Mayer,
supra note 72, at 320-21 (arguing that the state should maintain ultimate control
over disciplinary proceedings because they potentially could increase the length
of a prisoner's incarceration by reducing his chance for parole or good-time credits). Similar to store security guards or humane society officers, however, the private prison company could perform an accusatory function in which its agents
acted as complaining witnesses at disciplinary proceedings. See id. at 320 (suggesting this role for private prison company).
130. See id. at 317-19 (discussing private citizens' common law right to arrest
felons).
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Incarcerating prisoners, however, unlike
lawbreakers or managing railroad terminals, is a
the states traditionally have had to themselves.
cause this function is "intrinsically governmental
the courts may distinguish the administrative
cases and enjoin private prison operations on
grounds.

B.

13

identifying
power that
Thus, bein nature,"
delegation
delegation

Delegation of Rule-Making Authority

Administrative delegations raise the policy concern of
whether government should allow a private company to
manage a program rather than have the government manage
the program itself. A related concern is whether routine administrative decisions would contravene the goals of the
program. These concerns become more pronounced when
the legislature grants power to a private company to make
administrative rules that are binding on private persons.
The problem with this practice is that a private company
can exercise governmental power affecting a citizen's liberty
or property interests outside of any legislative or administrative control. This practice is constitutionally suspect for two
reasons: first, only the legislature has express constitutional
authority to exercise coercive governmental power in the
public interest; and second, a private company might make
rules that are repugnant to the public interest for its own
pecuniary or political gain.
Two common types of rule-making delegations are prevailing wage laws and statutes that adopt technical codes not
yet in existence. The prevailing wage laws typically provide
that private contractors who perform municipal contracts
must pay the prevailing wage established by a labor commissioner. They also typically provide that the labor commissioner must adopt a union wage rate established by collective bargaining.
131. See Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comrn'n, No. 84-1335, slip op. at 16
(D.D.C. Sept. 25, 1986) (dictum) (noting, in case upholding private delegation,
that "many responsibilities may be so intrinsically governmental in nature that
they may not be entrusted to a non-governmental entity"). The court suggested
"the powers to conduct foreign affairs or to establish military and naval forces" as
examples of nondelegable powers that are intrinsically governmental. Id. at n.24;
cf. Brief for Appellee at 32, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (arguing that
Congress's power to spend government revenues was nondelegable because it
was Congress's core function).
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IndustrialCommission v. C & D Pipeline1 32 is representative
of the cases holding prevailing wage laws unconstitutional
on delegation grounds.' 3 3 The Arizona Court of Appeals
noted that the statute granted no discretion "to the Commission to do anything other than ascertain and record the
union rate."' 3 4 Accordingly, the court held, under the Arizona Constitution, that the prevailing wage law unconstitu132. 125 Ariz. 64, 607 P.2d 383 (Ct. App. 1979).
133. The statute provided:
For the purpose of determining the general prevailing rate of per
diem wages, the industrial commission of Arizona shall ascertain and
keep on record the rates or scale of per diem wages required to be
paid to each craft or type of workman belonging to or affiliated with
the American Federation of Labor, the Arizona State Federation of
Labor, or any other state or national labor organization similarly
constituted, prevailing in the locality in which the public work is to
be performed. If such method of arriving at the general prevailing
rate of per diem wages cannot reasonably and fairly be applied in
any political subdivision of the state for the reason that no such organization is maintained in the political subdivision, the industrial
commission shall determine the prevailing rate to be the rate required to be paid to each craft or type of workman of the same or
most similar class, working in the same or most similar employment
in the nearest and most similar neighboring locality, and affiliated
with any such labor organization.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-324(A) (1974) (emphasis omitted in part); see 125 Ariz.
at 65-66, 607 P.2d at 384-85.
134. 125 Ariz. at 67, 607 P.2d at 386. The court distinguished Baughn v.
Gorell & Riley, 311 Ky. 537, 224 S.W.2d 436 (1949), a case cited by the Industrial
Commission that upheld a prevailing wage law. 125 Ariz. at 66, 607 P.2d at
385-86. The statute challenged in Baughn provided:
The wages paid for a legal, day's work to laborers, workmen,
mechanics, helpers, assistants and apprentices upon public works
shall not be less than the prevailing wages paid in the same trade or
occupation in the locality. The public authority shall establish prevailing wages at the same rate that prevails in the locality under
collective agreements or understandings between bona fide organizations of labor and their employers at the date the contract for public works is made if there are such agreements or understandings in
the locality applying to a sufficient number of employees to furnish a
reasonable basis for considering those rates to be the prevailing
rates in the locality.
311 Ky. at 540, 224 S.W.2d at 438 (emphasis omitted). The court in Industrial
Commission noted that, unlike the statute in Baughn, the Arizona statute granted no
discretion to the Commission to consider factors other than the union wage rate
to determine the prevailing wage rate. 125 Ariz. at 67, 607 P.2d at 385-86. The
court concluded that the Arizona statute was unconstitutional because it did not
grant any discretion to the Commission to question the union rate. Id. at 68, 607
P.2d at 386.
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tionally granted the power to determine the prevailing wage
1
to private unions and management.

35

Statutes adopting technical codes that a private trade association drafts and periodically revises raise delegation issues that are similar to those found in the prevailing wage
cases. If a state legislature were to adopt prospectively an
extant technical code, no delegation problem would exist.
In such a case, the legislature would merely be exercising its
right to adopt one political option over another.1 36 A delegation problem would arise, however, if a statute were to
adopt prospectively any changes that the technical trade association might make in the future. This type of statute
would grant the trade association power to make legally
binding rules that affect the property interests of private
tradesmen.
Hillman v. Northern Wasco County People's Utility District 137
is typical of the cases that hold such statutes unconstitutional. In Hillman, a contractor injured himself after receiving an electrical shock from exposed wiring in an old
building while he was removing some beams. 38 Hillman fell
from the wall after his shoe brushed against the exposed
wire.' 3 9 He later brought a tort action against the electric
140
company that had originally installed the wiring.
In his complaint, Hillman alleged that the Northern
Wasco County People's Utility District had violated the National Electric Code. 14 1 Oregon's adoption of the Code included revisions and additions "as they are published from
time to time."'' 42 After the trial court instructed the jurors
that violation of the Code would be negligence per se, 143 the
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. 144 Both plaintiff and
defendant cross-appealed from the trial court's order grant135.

125 Ariz. at 68, 607 P.2d at 386. For another case that held a prevailing

wage law unconstitutional, see Schryver v. Schirmer, 84 S.D. 352, 357-58, 171
N.W.2d 634, 637 (1969).
136. Liebmann, supra note 48, at 680.
137. 213 Or. 264, 323 P.2d 664 (1958), overruled on other grounds, Maulding v.
Clackamas County, 278 Or. 359, 563 P.2d 731 (1977).
138. Id. at 273-74, 323 P.2d at 669.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 270-72, 323 P.2d at 668.
141. Id. at 275-76, 323 P.2d at 670.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 270-71, 323 P.2d at 668.
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ing the defendant's motion for a new trial but denying its
45
motion for a judgment n.o.v.1

The issue that the defendant raised in support of its motion for a new trial was whether the statute that adopted the
Code, including revisions and additions not yet in existence,
unconstitutionally delegated legislative rule-making power
to the American Standards Association, the private party
that had drafted the Code. 146 The court stated that the Oregon Constitution vested lawmaking power exclusively in the
legislature1 47 and noted that neither the legislature nor any
other department of government had any control over the
Association. 4 8 As a result, the court held that the Oregon
statute unconstitutionally delegated legislative rule-making
49
power to the Association.1

Hillman also involved a similar private delegation issue
concerning the National Electric Safety Code, issued and periodically revised by the Bureau of Standards of the Department of Commerce.15 0

The court pointed out that the

Bureau adopted some of the Safety Code's provisions even
though it did not agree with them.' 5 ' These provisions were
proposed by private committees composed of representatives of various private groups that the Safety Code affected. 1 52 The Bureau followed this procedure because it
145. Id. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. Id. at
314-15, 323 P.2d at 688.
146. Id. at 275-83, 323 P.2d at 670-73.
147. Id. at 277-78, 323 P.2d at 671.
148. Id. at 278-81, 323 P.2d at 671-72.
149. Id. at 281, 323 P.2d at 673. Because the statute adopting the Code was
unconstitutional, any Code provision adopted pursuant to the statute did not have
any legal effect. Thus, the defendant achieved its objective of overcoming a finding of negligence per se solely because it did not comply with the Code. For other
cases that held statutes that adopted future technical codes unconstitutional on
delegation grounds, see, e.g., Agnew v. City of Culver City, 147 Cal. App. 2d 144,
156-57, 304 P.2d 788, 797 (1956); State v. Crawford, 104 Kan. 141, 143, 177 P.
360, 361 (1919).
150. 213 Or. at 281-87, 323 P.2d at 673-75.
151. Id. at 284-85, 323 P.2d at 674.
152. Id. In support of its observation, the court quoted the following passage
from the preface of the Bureau's handbook:
In preparation of the first few editions of the code, the Bureau held
meetings in many parts of the country and welcomed suggestions
from everyone concerned. It, however, reserved to itself the final
decision on all contested points. The procedure followed in later
revisions subsequent to the establishment of the American Standards Association differs essentially from the former practice in that
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placed a higher priority on promoting broad-based acceptance of the Safety Code in the private sector than on agreeing with all of its provisions.

53

Oregon's Public Service Commission was statutorily authorized to make safety rules for employers and common
carriers concerning the use of electrical equipment.1 54 The
Commission, in turn, adopted the Safety Code as it existed
at the time of its order, as well as all of the Bureau's subse155
quent revisions and additions to the Safety Code.
The court distinguished the enabling statute from the
Commission's order that adopted the Safety Code. The enabling statute was constitutional, the court noted, because
an administrative agency such as the Commission may adopt
an extant edition of the Code after a hearing and a proper
exercise of its discretion. 56 If the Commission did not do
so, the court observed, it would not perform its duty to determine whether the Safety Code provisions that the Bureau
adopted were "necessary and proper for the protection of
the health and safety of the citizens of this state."'' 57 The
court asserted, however, that the Commission abdicated its
legislative power when it adopted future Safety Code provisions without further consideration.15 8
The court in Hillman, like most state courts, spoke in
conclusory terms about the unconstitutionality of private
delegations, without specifically indicating the policy confinal decisions as to all details are made by the sectional committees
formally approved by the American Standards Association and operating under their rules of procedure. The Bureau, as sponsor for the
work under this procedure, has given up its prerogative of determining details in return for the implied understanding that the many
parties concerned will accept such a code as they can agree upon
among themselves. All such codes of practice necessarily include
compromises between conflicting aims. The Bureau has felt that decisions made by practically unanimous agreement among the interests affected would, in general, be wiser than those at which it might
arrive after weighing the arguments of advocates for different views.
It has, therefore, welcomed this procedure in spite of the fact that
this involves the acceptance of some details of which it might not
itself approve.
Id.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id. at 281-83,
Id. at 282-85,
Id. at 284-85,
Id. at 285-86,
Id. at 286-87,

323
323
323
323
323

P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d

at 673.
at 673-74.
at 674.
at 674-75.
at 675.
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cerns that inspired the doctrine. But it did make three assertions that evinced its real policy concerns. First, the court
explained that no department of government had any control over a private organization. 59 Second, the court stated
that, through the Constitution, the people vested the lawmaking power in the legislature.' 60 Thus, the people effectively prohibited any group except the legislature from
exercising lawmaking powers. 161 Third, the court noted that
when private parties adopt rules that further their own interests, the rules may not reflect the best judgment of an
agency that is concerned only with the public interest.162
Thus, the court's underlying policy concern apparently was
that a private party, not subject to any political control,
could impose rules to further its own interest at the expense
of the public interest.

63

Industrial Commission and Hillman are examples of the
state courts' almost uniform condemnation of statutes delegating rule-making power to private parties. Both cases addressed similar concerns about whether private organizations would make rules that placed personal gain ahead of
public welfare and whether the absence of neutral administrative agency review of the private parties' determination
would encourage self-serving policies. This latter aspect was
particularly troublesome, the cases noted, because the private parties themselves were not subject to any political control. Both cases indicated, however, that a rule that a private
party proposes is not constitutionally suspect if it is adopted
by an administrative agency that has power to accept, reject,
or modify the rule.

64

In the private prison context, the principles that these
cases establish would not permit a legislature to authorize a
private prison company to make rules governing the conduct
of the prisoners who are committed to its care. The prison
159. Id. at 277-79, 323 P.2d at 671.
160. Id. at 279-80, 323 P.2d at 671 (quoting Marr v. Fisher, 182 Or. 383, 187
P.2d 966 (1947)).

161. Id.
162. Id. at 285-86, 323 P.2d at 674-75.
163. But see Liebmann, supra note 48, at 682-84 (arguing that, because private
rule-making affects the community at large, any abuses are visible and likely to be
corrected by the political process).
164. Cf. id. at 680 (noting that the Supreme Court has held that "freedom for
private groups to seek their legislative ends is itself constitutionally protected").
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company could propose rules to an administrative agency,
however, if the agency had authority to accept, reject, or
modify them. The agency would then have a constitutional
duty to exercise discretion concerning whether and in what
form it should adopt the rules.
It must be emphasized that the rules at issue in Industrial
Commission and Hillman only affected the property interests of
private tradesmen. Any rules governing a private prison,
however, likely would affect the prisoners' life and liberty interests as well as other fundamental constitutional rights.
Because of these differences in the constitutional importance of the interests affected, a court might require the legislature or an administrative agency to take a more active
role in determining the rules by which private prisons governed the prisoners under the company's control. A court
might hold, for example, that a statute authorizing a private
prison is unconstitutional on delegation grounds unless it
specifies in detail the rules governing the relationship between the private prison company and the prisoners under
the company's control. 65 Alternatively, a court might require an administrative agency to create the necessary rules.
Neither of these holdings would prevent private prison companies from proposing their own rules. The legislature or
administrative agency merely would draft the rules itself, instead of passively reviewing the private party's proposals.
Because of the life and liberty interests involved, however, a
court might bar the delegation altogether.
C.

Delegation of Adjudicative Powers

When a private party exercises delegated administrative
and rule-making power, its actions generally affect a large
number of persons and entities. If a private party exercises
delegated adjudicative power, however, its actions usually
affect a single person or entity. Because of the disproportionate effect of an exercise of adjudicative power, an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of such power is not as easily
corrected through the political process. Therefore, courts
165. Of course, a rule itself may be unconstitutional on other grounds, even

though the delegation is proper.
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should scrutinize delegations of such power more carefully. 166

State courts generally invalidate statutes and administrative regulations that delegate adjudicative power to private parties when there is no provision for judicial review
of the private adjudications. When there is provision for
such review, however, the delegation generally is upheld.
DiLoreto v. Fireman'sFund Insurance Co. 167 is an example of the
latter type of case. At issue in DiLoreto was a private insurer's
authority pursuant to a Massachusetts statute implementing
regulations of the Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds. 1 68 The statute allowed a private insurer to determine, in the first instance, whether an insured
was at fault in an accident, in order to assess a premium
surcharge. 69 The insured retained the right, however, to
both administrative 7° and judicial' 7' review.
DiLoreto argued that the delegation of adjudicative authority to a private insurer violated the Massachusetts Constitution. 72 The Massachusetts SupremeJudicial Court first
166. Liebmann, supra note 48, at 682-83. Liebmann explained several differences between rule-making and adjudicative power that suggest a greater need for
judicial scrutiny of the latter type of power. He noted that "abuses of rule making
power are more visible, fall on and thus give rise to reaction by the community at
large, and may more readily be redressed after the event." Id. at 682. Liebmann
contrasted this with adjudicative powers because they "bear more heavily on individuals, while abuses of them are less likely to be brought to public view or be
susceptible of easy correction." Id. at 682-83. Liebmann concluded that courts
should scrutinize carefully and, in most cases, invalidate delegations of adjudicative power. Id.
167. 383 Mass. 243, 418 N.E.2d 612 (1981).
168. Id. at 244, 418 N.E.2d at 613.
169. Id. at 245-46, 418 N.E.2d at 614. The insurer's determination is binding
on the insured unless the insured appeals the insurer's decision to the Board of
Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds. See MASS. ANN. LAws ch.
175, § 13P (Law. Co-op. 1977) (insured may appeal any determination of insurer
within 30 days). Thus, the insurer's authority in this situation is greater than the
authority granted to store security guards, because the insurer's decision is a
binding, albeit appealable, determination of the insured's rights and the onus of
challenging that decision is on the insured. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text (noting that store security guards in Indiana have no authority to arrest
or charge suspected shoplifters but rather have authority only to hold suspected
shoplifters until police can come to make arrest).
170. See MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 175, § I13P (Law. Co-op. 1977) (insured may
appeal insurer's determination to Board within 30 days of adverse decision).
171. See id. (insured may appeal Board's decision to superior court).
172. 383 Mass. at 245, 418 N.E.2d at 614. The stipulated facts on which the
insurer based its decision to surcharge were as follows. DiLoreto parked his automobile along the right hand side of a street and opened the left front door to exit
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explained that the merit-rating program was based on a detailed and comprehensive plan established by the Board pursuant to statutory mandate.' 73 It then noted that Board
regulations narrowly channeled the insurer's determination. , 74 Additionally, the insurer's determination was subject
to administrative and judicial review.' 75 Thus, the court asserted that the statutory scheme prevented the insurer from
benefiting from its decision to assess a surcharge in a particular case.' 76 The court concluded, therefore, that the statute
did not unconstitutionally delegate adjudicative power to
77
private insurers. 1
In upholding the DiLoreto statute, the court distinguished its earlier holding in Coming Glass Works v. Ann &
1 79
Hope, Inc.' 78 The nonsigner provision of the fair trade law
in Coming Glass was constitutionally defective because there
was no standard to limit the contracting parties' discretion
to set the retail price that others must charge.' 80 Furtherhis automobile. After opening the door and starting to get out of the automobile,
DiLoreto noticed another automobile headed toward his vehicle at an unsafe
speed of approximately 30 miles an hour. The driver was not paying attention to
her driving, but instead was talking to a passenger. After observing the approaching vehicle, DiLoreto got back into his automobile. At that point, the vehicle
struck his door. The insurer assessed a surcharge on DiLoreto pursuant to a regulatory presumption that a person whose doors are opened at the time of a collision is at fault in excess of 50%. Id. at 244 & n.3, 418 N.E.2d at 613-14 & n.3.
173. Id. at 246-47, 418 N.E.2d at 614-15.
174. Id. at 247, 418 N.E.2d at 615.
175. Id.
176. Id. The statute created a system by which the insurer must offset all of its
surcharges with good-driver credits in an amount equal to its income from the
surcharges, including the insurer's income from investing the proceeds of the
surcharge prior to distribution. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 175, § 113P (Law. Co-op.
1977).
177. 383 Mass. at 247-48, 418 N.E.2d at 615.
178. 363 Mass. 409, 294 N.E.2d 354 (1973).
179. See 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 16, .§ 3.12, at 196. Davis explained the history
and effect of nonsigner provisions of fair trade laws as follows:
The history of non-signer provisions of the so-called fair trade laws
may have some value. Such laws were enacted by 46 states. A nonsigner provision of such a law provides that a minimum resale price
fixed in an agreement between a manufacturer (or other distributor)
and a retailer is binding upon other retailers. The effect is that parties to such an agreement have the legislative power to fix the minimum resale price at which nonparties may sell; any seller who sells at
a price lower than the price fixed in such an agreement is subject to
suit by any person damaged.
Id.
180. DiLoreto, 383 Mass. at 246-47, 418 N.E.2d at 615.
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more, the statute at issue in Coming Glass did not provide for
administrative or judicial review of the private decision.'18
Therefore, the DiLoreto court concluded that, because the insurance statute provided an effective standard to channel the
private insurer's discretion and adequate review of private
party determinations, the delegation was constitutional.182
The court in DiLoreto upheld a delegation of adjudicative power because of the availability of judicial review. If
review of a private adjudication is not available, however,
state courts generally invalidate such delegations. International Service Agencies v. O'Shea 183 is typical of those cases. International Service Agencies (ISA) had requested the right
to participate in the annual solicitation of charitable contributions from New York state employees through the State
Employees Federated Appeals (SEFA).184 The statute in
question provided that the Commissioner of General Services must select one "federated community campaign"18 5 for

each county or area in which a solicitation took place.18 6
The Commissioner, in turn, delegated to the United Way
and the National Health Agencies his authority to select the
charitable nonprofit organization that would have the right
to participate in a local campaign. 8 7 ISA had applied to both
the Commissioner and the United Way for permission to
participate in a local charitable drive.188 Both entities rejected ISA's applications.18 9
ISA argued that the Commissioner unconstitutionally
delegated the power to select local federated community
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Id.
104 Misc. 2d 1071, 430 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. Ct. 1980).

184. Id. at 1072, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
185. See id. at 1073, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 226. The statute defined a federated community campaign as "a charitable non-profit organization which solicits funds for
distribution among a substantial number of charitable non-profit organizations,
which has been approved as such by the Commissioner of General Services." Id.
ISA solicited funds for seven different charities. Id. at 1072, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
Thus, ISA would have qualified under the statutory definition if the Commissioner of General Services had approved its program.
186. Id. at 1073, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 226.
187. Id. at 1074, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 226-27.
188. Id. at 1076-77, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 228. The Commissioner referred ISA to
the United Way which, in turn, referred ISA back to the Commissioner. The court
described this process as a "Ring around the Rosey." Id.
189. Id.
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campaigns to private charities.19 0 The New York Supreme
Court observed that the Commissioner admitted that he had
no role in the decision concerning ISA's participation in the
federated campaign.'19 The court charged that, although
the Commissioner was empowered to do so, he failed to
promulgate regulations establishing a procedure to determine inclusion in a SEFA.I 9 2 As a result, the statutory delegation unconstitutionally deprived ISA of a valuable interest
in soliciting funds directly from state employees' pay93

checks.1

The court's primary policy concern became apparent
when it noted three times in the opinion the likelihood that
the United Way's self-interest motivated ISA's exclusion
from participating in a SEFA. 19 4 On one such occasion, for
example, the court observed that "[4o]ne can readily understand the reluctance of United Way to permit ISA to join in.
Their own self-interest would dictate a policy of exclusion in
order to maximize the amount of their own contributions."195
A case that raised similar issues was Group Health Insurance v. Howell.' 96 In that case, Group Health Insurance of
New Jersey (GHI), a nonprofit corporation, proposed to offer a medical services plan 9 7 similar to the then-existing
190. id. at 1073, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 226.
191. Id. at 1074, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 226.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1076-78, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 228-29. ]In so holding, the court rejected
the argument that state employees remained free to make donations to ISA if they
chose to do so. Id. at 1076, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 228. Instead, the court held that ISA
had a due process interest in a fair opportunity for inclusion in a SEFA. Id. at
1077, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
194. Id. at 1074, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 227 ("it is clear that delegations of public
authority must be carefully circumscribed to insure that self-interest does not become the overriding consideration."); id. at 1077, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 228 ("Fortunately, the reins of government cannot be turned over to private interest groups
to be utilized to preserve self-interests."); see infra text accompanying note 195
(noting United Way's pecuniary interest in excluding ISA).
195. Id. at 1076-77, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
196. 40 NJ. 436, 193 A.2d 103 (1963).
197. See id. at 439-41, 193 A.2d at 105-06. The statute at issue defined a medical services plan as
any plan or arrangement operated by such a corporation under the
provisions of the Law whereby the expense of medical services to
subscribers and covered dependents is paid in whole or in part by
such corporation to participating physicians of such plans or arrangements and to others as provided in the Law. A subscriber is
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plan that Blue Shield offered.198 A New Jersey statute provided, however, that before a company could offer such a
program it had to obtain prior approval from the Medical
Society.' 99 The Commissioner of Banking and Insurance
was powerless under the statute to certify a corporation's
proposed medical services plan without the approval of Blue
Shield. 200 Because the statute in effect delegated to Blue
Shield the power to deny licenses to corporations proposing
medical service plans, 20 ' the court held that the delegation
20 2
violated the New Jersey Constitution.
The New Jersey Supreme Court specifically noted two
policy concerns with the delegation at issue. First, the statute contained no standards or safeguards to guide Blue
one to whom a subscription certificate is issued by the corporation

which sets forth the kinds and extent of the medical services for
which the corporation is liable to make payment. A participating
physician is any physician licensed to practice medicine and surgery
in NewJersey, who agrees in writing with the corporation to perform
the medical services specified in the subscription certificates issued
by the corporation, at such rates of compensation as shall be determined by its board of trustees, and who agrees to abide by the corporation's rules. Medical service includes all general and special
medical and surgical services ordinarily provided by such licensed
physicians in accordance with accepted practices in the community.
No subscriber or his covered dependents shall be liable for any payment to any participating physician for medical services specified in
the subscriber's certificate to be paid to the participating physician
by the corporation.
Id. at 441-42, 193 A.2d at 106 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48A-1 (West 1939 &
Supp. 1962)).
198. Id. at 443, 193 A.2d at 107.
199. Id. at 444-45, 193 A.2d at 108. The statute did not, in so many words,
require Blue Shield's approval. Instead, it required approval of a recognized
medical society with at least 2,000 members that was incorporated for at least 10
years. The court noted, however, that the parties did not dispute that Blue Shield,
a private organization, was the only organization that met the statutory requirements. Thus, although the statute did not provide expressly that Blue Shield's
approval was a necessary prerequisite to having the state license a medical services plan, its effect was identical. Id.
200. Id. at 446, 193 A.2d at 109. Technically, the organization from which approval was necessary was the "Medical Society." Although legally separate from
Blue Shield, the Medical Society formed Blue Shield, had four interlocking directors, and approved nominees to Blue Shield's board of directors before they were
elected. Thus, the court noted that, in practical effect, the Medical Society represented Blue Shield's interests in licensing matters. Id. at 445, 193 A.2d at 107.
Therefore, the terms "Medical Society" and "Blue Shield" are interchangeable
when discussing this case.
201. Id. at 446-47, 193 A.2d at 109.
202. Id. at 447, 193 A.2d at 109.
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Shield's discretion.203 Second, the court declared that this
deficiency was exacerbated because "the Medical Society's
self-interest might tend to color its determination whether
to approve

. . .

an applicant which may become a competi-

20 4
tor of Blue Shield."
The state cases discussing delegation of adjudicative
power to private parties have established several principles.
If judicial review of a private adjudication is available, as in
DiLoreto, courts are more likely to uphold the delegation
even though the private determination is binding until reversed on appeal, and the onus of appealing the action is on
the affected party. Such a result is still more likely if, as in
DiLoreto, the statute limits the delegate's discretion so as to
preclude any pecuniary interest in adjudicative outcomes. If
judicial review were not available, however, state courts
would not uphold the delegation.

D. Application of State Law to Private Prisons
Because prison privatization is in its infancy, no
ported cases have ruled on a delegation challenge to a
vate prison's operations. Therefore, the courts have
explicated the standards that they would use to judge

reprinot
the

203. Id.
204. Id. As in InternationalService Agencies, the court in Howell noted its concern

about the self-interest of the licensor, Blue Shield, on several different occasions.
See id. at 445, 193 A.2d at 108 (legislature may not empower private party to determine who has a right to engage in an otherwise lawful enterprise if "exercise of
such power is not accompanied by adequate legislative standards or safeguards
whereby an applicant may be protected against arbitrary or self-motivated action
on the part of such private body"); id. at 447, 193 A.2d at 109 (the "Medical Society .. .has an interest in promoting the welfare of the only existing medical
service corporation in this State"). For other cases that held delegations of licensing power unconstitutional, see, e.g.,
Gumbhir v. Kansas State Bd. of Pharmacy,
228 Kan. 579, 588, 618 P.2d 837, 842 (1980) (invalidating a statute that excluded
graduates of pharmacy schools not approved by private accrediting agency from
taking the entrance examination necessary to register as a pharmacist); Fink v.
Cole, 302 N.Y. 216, 225, 97 N.E.2d 873, 876 (1951) (holding unconstitutional an
act that allowed a private jockey club to license participants in horse races); Farias
v. City of New York, 101 Misc. 2d 598, 604-05, 421 N.Y.S.2d 753, 757 (Sup. Ct.
1979) (invalidating statutory requirement that private Society for Prevention of
Cruelty to Children must approve any permit allowing children to perform);
Union Trust Co. v. Simmons, 116 Utah 422, 429-30, 211 P.2d 190, 192-93 (1949)
(charging that a statute requiring approval of existing banks in a community
before a new branch bank could operate unconstitutionally delegated power to a
competitor whose private interest in excluding competition may not coincide with
the public interest).
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constitutionality of such a delegation. The principles announced in delegation cases in other contexts, however,
provide some evidence of the delegation standards that
courts might apply.
First, the courts might uphold the constitutionality of
delegations of management functions to private prison companies. Management functions would include activities such
as cell assignment, scheduling, record-keeping, and counting the prisoners. The courts might uphold such activities
even though they incidentally affected the liberty of the prisoners. To avoid constitutional defect, however, the management activities at the least would have to apply uniformly to
all prisoners and could not unreasonably restrict constitutional freedoms-for example, religious freedoms-of any
inmate.
Second, the courts might uphold the right of private
prison companies to propose internal disciplinary rules.
The rules could not form the basis for disciplining inmates,
however, unless they were adopted by the state legislature or
an administrative agency with authority to accept, reject, or
modify the proposed rules. The rules would also be unconstitutional if they were so vague that they granted too much
power to the private companies to single out arbitrarily an
inmate for punishment.
Finally, the courts would not allow a private prison company to make a binding factual determination that an inmate
had violated a prison rule and was therefore subject to discipline. This is true because the private prison company is not
a neutral decision-maker. If the prison company's compensation were based on the number of inmates it housed each
day, for example, a decision to revoke an inmate's good-time
credits would inure to the company's financial benefit. Even
if the private prison's compensation were based on a flat rate
or were otherwise unrelated to the length of an inmate's incarceration, however, the company nevertheless would have
an institutional bias toward disciplining prisoners. A decision to deny certain privileges or services, for example,
would reduce the operating costs of the company and would
promote its administrative convenience. Thus, a private
prison company may decide to discipline a prisoner to further its own interests at the expense of the interests of both
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the inmate and the public. 20 5 Moreover, any exercise of

nonreviewable discretion by the company would be cheaper
than complying with due process constraints. Therefore,
the only input that a private prison company constitutionally
might have concerning the decision whether a prisoner had
violated a disciplinary rule is that of a complaining witness
2
before a judicial officer. 06
CONCLUSION

The delegation doctrine has developed differently at the
federal and state levels. At the federal level, the constitutionality of a delegation to a private prison company would
likely turn on the structure under which the delegation occurred. If the corrections agency both formulated disciplinary procedures and maintained control of disciplinary
proceedings, the courts might uphold the delegation on the
theory that the private corporation was employed in an administrative capacity to carry the law into effect. If a private
prison company formulated disciplinary rules, however, or if
it had control over disciplinary proceedings, the courts
might then apply the three-pronged Todd test to determine
whether or not the delegation was constitutional. But, even
if the delegation were held to be constitutional, the principles announced in Todd would require the private company
to comply meticulously with appellate procedure in all of its
disciplinary proceedings. Finally, federal courts nevertheless might not apply the reasoning in these cases to the pri205. In DiLoreto v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 383 Mass. 243, 418 N.E.2d 612
(1981), the insurer was required to offset totally any income from surcharges it
had assessed with good-driving credits to other customers that it insured. Thus,
the insurer had no financial incentive to assess a surcharge in any particular case.
Indeed, the regulation requiring the insurer to assess a surcharge was necessary,
as the court pointed out, because the absence of any financial incentive to do so
created a natural bias against assessing surcharges due to the insurer's desire to
promote good customer relations. Id. at 247-48, 418 N.E.2d at 615. In the private prison context, contrastingly, there is a natural bias in favor of disciplining
inmates. Thus, the opinion in DiLoreto does not support the proposition that a
private prison company can constitutionally perform the adjudicative function of
*determining whether an inmate has violated a rule.
206. In practice, the system could operate in much the same manner as the
mental commitment process in Fairfax County, Virginia. There, private mental
hospitals contract to detain temporarily persons alleged to be dangerous to themselves or others as a result of mental illness. The private hospital's only role in
the actual commitment, however, is that of a complaining witness before a judicial
officer who travels to the hospital to conduct the commitment hearing.
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vate prison context because the courts have indicated that a
different analysis may apply to delegations affecting liberty,
rather than property, interests.
At the state level, legislatures constitutionally might
adopt an extant disciplinary code proposed by a private
company. If the private party regularly amended the code,
however, those amendments could not constitutionally bind
prisoners until the legislature or an administrative agency
specifically adopted them.
State courts generally invalidate statutes and administrative regulations that delegate adjudicative power to private parties when there is no provision for judicial review of
the private determinations. When there is provision for
such review, however, the delegation generally is upheld.
If a private prison contract were structured so that the
company did not financially benefit from its decision to revoke a prisoner's good-time credits, the principles announced in DiLoreto might permit the prison company to
adjudicate the prisoner's rights in the first instance ifjudicial
review were available. Even in such a case, however, statutory or administrative rules would have to channel the
prison's discretion concerning its procedure for adjudicating
a prisoner's rights. However, because any adjudication by a
private prison company would directly affect a prisoner's liberty rather than merely his property, courts may distinguish
cases such as DiLoreto and hold that a private prison company is not empowered to decide whether a prisoner has violated a disciplinary rule.
Finally, any prison privatization plan must take special
account of the policy concern that the delegate's private interests will prevail over the interests of both the affected
party and the public. When such a conflict of interests exists, the courts may invalidate the delegations whether or not
judicial review is available.
Absent clear precedent, of course, good predictions
about the direction and application of the law are difficult to
make. There are no clear precedents regarding delegation of
the incarceration function to private corporations. In an important sense, though, the delegation question is also a
question of symbolism.
The American Correctional Association began its 1985
policy statement on prison privatization: "Government has
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the ultimate authority and responsibility for corrections." 20 7
This should be undeniable. When a court enters a judgment
of conviction and imposes a sentence, it exercises its authority, both actually and symbolically. Does it weaken that authority, however-as well as the integrity of a system of
justice-when an inmate looks at his keeper's uniform and
sees an emblem that reads "Acme Corrections Company,"
for example, instead of "Federal Bureau of Prisons," or
"State Department of Corrections"?
In other words, apart from questions of cost, apart from
questions of efficiency, apart from questions of liability, and
assuming that inmates will retain no fewer rights and privileges than they had before the transfer to private management, who should operate our nation's prisons and jails? It
could certainly be argued that virtually anything that is done
in a total, secure institution by the government or its designee is an important expression of government policy, and
therefore should not be delegated. Just as we would not
likely privatize our criminal courts, perhaps we should not
privatize our prisons. And just as the inmate should perhaps
be obliged to know-day by day, minute by minute-that he
is in the custody of the government, perhaps too the government should be obliged to know-also day by day, minute by
minute-that it is its brother's keeper, even with all of its
flaws. I cannot help but wonder what Dostoevsky-who
wrote that "[t]he degree of civilization in a society is revealed by entering its prisons" 2 0 8 -would have thought
about privatization of corrections.
But, while prison privatization arguably may not be wise
as a matter of public policy, this does not mean that delegating the incarceration function to a private company would
necessarily be unconstitutional. In, deciding the constitutional question, therefore, the courts ultimately will be determining how we wish to be perceived as a civilization.
207. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL CORRECTIONAL POLICY
ON PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN CORRECTIONS 1 (1985).
208. F. DOSTOEVSKY, THE HOUSE OF THE DEAD 76 (C. Garnett trans. 1957).

